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Introduction
I." TilE 1920S I. A. Richards usually presents his psychological aes-
thetics as a contribution to science. As a result it is commonplace to
think of Richards as a positivist who sees his task as 'translating'
Romantic and Idealist aesthetics into scientific psychology and semi-
otics.' \X!hile this account of his early work is undoubtedly true, in
this paper I wish to look at a little known essay by Richards, 'Nine-
teen Hundred and Now' (1927), which is one of the few places where
Richards offers not onlv to locate his work in a definite histoncal
context, but to present it as a response to the needs and mterests of
a particular social group in a particular historical situation..' 'Nine-
teen Hundred and Now' thus raises the issue of what in Richards'
work may be considered as scientific, or at least as haVing truth value
Independent of Its historical context, and what in his work is the
function of a specific hlstorico-social perspective or, to put it another
way, what in his work is Ideological.
If we think of 'Nineteen Hundred and Now' as Richards' self-his-
toriCisation, we can go on to consider the validity of Richards' own
account of his work, and ask whether we can historicise Richards'
work In a way that is fuller, more precise, more objective.
So, in the first part of this paper I will examine what Richards says
of hiS own situation and the needs of the SOCIal group with which he
identifies. And in the second part I will offer a different historicisa-
tion of Richards' work, one that draws upon the views of two
eminent intellectual hlstonans of Central European provenance,
Rene Wellek and Georg Lukacs. Wellek's commentary on Richards
points us towards the intellectual context of the 'Philosophy of Life'
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And Lukacs' dis-
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cussion of this same philosophical trend enables us to extend our
contextualisation to the social, economic and political.
I
'Nineteen Hundred and Now'
In 'Nineteen Hundred and Now', published in 1927, Richards
makes the common historicist assumption that works of literature
and art manifest the 'tendencies of the age'. And Richards wants to
read ,off the tendencies of the present age from contemporary litera-
ture. The 'present' for this essay is the post-World War I period, as it
has developed into the middle 1920S. Richards wants to define the
'present' by comparing It with the immediate past, that is, the decade
or so from the turn of the century to World War I. Hence the title of
the essay - 'Nineteen Hundred and Now'. The essay thus compares
those whom Richards takes to be the representative writers of the
pre-war period with those of the post-war period.
But all this is not merely a scholarly exercise in literary history. It
is criticism that aims to serve a practical purpose. The tendencies of
the age are to reveal the needs of the present, and to suggest what
kind of literature is needed at present, that is, in the 1920S. The
assumption here is that the function of literature and art is to serve a
social need. But for Richards such a need is to be defined psycholog-
ically. The needs in question pertain directly to the psyche, and not
to social institutIons, or the economy, or politics. So Richards is
interested in the psychological condition of people alive in the 1920S.
Richards asserts that the dominant trend in the collective mental
life of the present is a 'reversal of the roles of intellect and feeling'.' He
associates this with the currency of philosophers such as Bergson and
William James. These philosophers arc not the cause of the reversal.
Their currency is simply a sign that the reversal has occurred:
Richards rejects Bergson's explanation for this shift toward
feeling. Bergson finds the explanation in the Inadequacy of ratio-
nalist philosophy and psychology. Richards prefers his usual account
of the rise of natural science and the corresponding decline of reli-
gion. In this situation, according to Richards, man now feels alone,
without God, in the universe. When we now feel secure, he says, our
sense of security comes from feeling, not as the result of a process of
thinking: Thus feeling, but not necessarily religious feeling, comes
to be regarded as our ehief guide and support'.'
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In view of the explanation In terms of the rise of science and the
decline of religion, all this might seem to apply to the pre-war period
as well as to the post-war period. Hut Richards now comes specifi-
cally to his account of the present.
Richards admits that in the post-war period rhere is still intellec-
tualism, but for Richards this is shallow. Intellectual debates are
merely rationalizations for conflicts which are really emotional.' The
representative intellectual of the present is Aldous Huxley:
Mr Huxley, indeed, excellently represents the most fre-
quent predicament of rhe Anglo-American (or Anglo-
New York?) intelligentsia· the feelings neither simple
enough, strong enough, nor sufficiently rooted to WIn a
srable poise, and the Intelligence merely a clever subordi-
nate, abetting - like the servant in an old comedv - all the
rival machinations of rhe principal figures in rotation."
By contrast, the representative mrdlectual of the pre-war period
is H, G, Wells. Richards sees \X/ells as a serious-minded thinker, a
true 'rationalist', with 'programmes, policies, and concrete prophe-
cies','" Wells' retains the outlook of Thomas Huxley, the confidence
that hard thinking is by Itself a sufficient guide to life'." Hut it is thiS
very rationalism that is responsible for Wells' no longer being a
popular thinker. That [i.e. Wells' rationalism] is why the younger
generation no longer reads him with rhe same enrhuslasm'.'~
It seems that this 'younger generarion' arc preoccupied with their
own feelings, but bewildered by too much information or speculation
about the psyche. They are experlencmg a 'general disorientation',
and are disturbed by the 'increasmg mixrure of cultures'. But most of
all, they are diSillusioned from the war.' Their problems, in fact, are
psychologICal, and 'quire different from the SOCial and politICal prob-
lems with which Mr Wells IS concerned'." Ar rhls point RIChards
identifies himself with thIS generarion, and insisrs on their behalf
that psychological therapy musr precede social or pohtical engage-
ment: 'We feel a need lor order m our own mmds before we can ser
abour ordering the affairs of men m genera!'."
H. G. Wells has become unpopular a~ an mrellectual because true
intellectualism is no longer to the ra~re of rhe \"(Junger generation. Hur
Wells can no longer satJs~' thl~ generation a~ a novelist eIther, smce
Wells's Ilction seems 'thin', or lacking III emotional ~uhsrance.'·· G. R
Shaw is also 'vanishing over the honlOn' tor the ~ame reason," Richards
argues that the only wrirers who can nfYl.i..' an as a '/:.'1Ilde to life' arc those
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who show a 'natural command of emotion'." In this respect Shaw is to
be considered inferior to D. H. Lawrence. Shaw may talk about the Life
Force, but he does not feel it. D. H. Lawrence feels it.'"
For Richards the social question of the 1920S arises out of
changed social conditions, and involves ideas indirectly, but is in
itself a question about the psyche. The Industrial Revolution has not
only changed the conditions in which people live. It has changed the
people themselves. As a result traditional morality, hitherto sup-
ported by religion (now in decline), no longer 'fits'. In some places it
is too tight, in others too loose.:" But if there is to be a new, more
appropriate morality, it can only arise our of 'closer contact with life',
and a 'fuller, less inhibited, and more natural response in feeling'.:' So
the social question becomes a moral question, and the moral ques-
tion becomes one of ordering the psyche.
The ordering of the psyche, which is essentially the organization
of emotions, cannot be done by intellectuals such as Wells, who
think about social and political reforms. This ordering can only be
done by the artist.:: Richards is insistent: 'If the signs of the times as
revealed in literature point to anything it is this: that no doctrine
today has any power to free us. Disordered feelings cannot be puri-
fied by preaching'.:'
On the basis of this position Richards makes a survey of contem-
porary writers, judging them by the criterion of whether they can
satisfy the emotional need that Richards has identified as the urgent
question of the present. Some writers, like Bridges and Housman, are
'out of the stream of current tendencies', and so offer no help.:'
Others. like de la Mare or Yeats, produce work that is a 'confession of
defeat', a retreat into a child-like dream world, or into occultism.:<
Even writers who are more responsive to the demands of the present,
like Huxley and Lawrence, are deficient. As we have seen, Huxley's
feeling is shallow, and his intellectualism spurious. Lawrence is supe-
rior in the depth and strength of his feeling. Rut even Lawrence,
while he rejects traditional doctrines that stifle or distort feeling,
cannot resist substituting new doctrines of his own, and these are
'equally if not more disturbing in their interference' with feeling. At
the same time, paradoxically, in Lawrence's work feeling is so pow-
erful that reason becomes a 'mere slave' to it.,"
Doctrine cannot save us. 'A wider acceptance of life is, in fact, the
only way out'." T. S. Eliot and James Joyce arc the only writers found
to satisfy Richards' criterion. Richards' account of Eliot's poetry is,
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of course, famihar. Eliot makes his work 'a means of gathering
cogether {his] faculties co win a new order from the turmoil'.:' Like
Shakespeare, Donne, Mihon, and Shelley ('at his best'), Eliot is 'not
merely exploiting our ready-made feclings, but IS weaving them into
new patterns that have never eXIsted before'.~" Eliot reconciles emo-
tional conflicts so that a condition of 'poise' or 'serenity' is produced,
and this is equated with Arnold's 'capacity to see life steadily and see
It whole'."' The same vision of acceptance of life is ascribed co Joyce's
Ulysses." And so, for Richards, The ~ste Land and Ulysses are the
'supremely representative works of this third decade', the 1920S. ":
With their help the younger generation have more clear-sightedness,
and 'better mental foundations'. even if'hopes are not so lofty, ideals
less in eVIdence, and faith, if we distinguish this from knowledge,
much declined'. II
Rationalism and Ideology
Since Richards is anxious about this reversal of the roles of intellect
and feeling, and about reason becoming a 'mere slave' of feeling, why
does he not offer co shore up reason against feeling? Why, for
example, does he not side with his former Cambridge colleah'1Je,
Bertrand Russell, and opt for a secular humanism based upon a scien-
tific world outlook? Richards is after all very definitely a positivist,
who believes that all real knowledge belongs to science. CI Russell had
published several books on social and political reform during the war
years, and in 1927, the year in which Richards published 'Nineteen
Hundred and Now', Russell was still arguing that 'the good life is one
inspired by love and gUided by knowledge' ... Russell never abandoned
this scientifically informed humanism or the social and political proJ-
ects associated With it.
Russell is, of course, a VIctorian like Wells, and so falls with Wells
as an obsolete rationalist. But this merely begs the question. Why is
Richards opposed to rationalism at all?
It is remarkable that Richards offers no arh'1Jments whatever for
rejecting rationalism. He has motives for doing so, but no reasons. He
merely says that 'hiS generation' is disillusioned and dlsonented, and
needs the emotional ordering that onl\' art can supply. Hut he offers
no argument co show that a rationalist approach to the problems of
the age cannot Influence the emotional life of people, nor that a
rationalist approach co questions of society and politics can have no
relevance co the provision of conditions for a healthy and harmo-
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nious emotional life. For Richards problems of the psyche have
simply been dissociated from the kinds of social and political issues
with which pre-war intellectuals like Wells, Shaw, and Russell were
concerned. What we have here is an emotional recoil from the public
world, a dogmatic refusal to consider it or, as we would say now, an
instance of denial.
We may suppose that this is not just Richards' own psychological
condition. It seems reasonable to assume that it must have been
shared to some extent by people of his generation. But, of course, it
is not the only reaction in the '920S to the public world. The femi-
nist movement continues, while communism and fascism are begin-
ning to gather their forces. And as Richards himself notices, even
writers like Huxley, and Lawrence are promulgating doctrines that
bear on the life of society. Richards' abstentionism comes to seem
the exception rather than the rule, and his picture of 'his generation'
as one-sided and partial. We must conclude that it is the very polari-
sation of class politics, and the continuing activity of gender politICs
that leads to a fraction of the middle class intelligentsia opting for
what looks like a revived aestheticism. To thIs extent we can take
Richards' diagnosis of the '920S, and the psychological aesthetics
that he constructs for It, as an expression of the crisis of post-war lib-
eralism. And his positivism fits in neatly, since it justifies the subjec-
tivism of Richards' aesthetics. If all real knowledge belongs to
science, then literature and art have no cognitive dImension, and
their only role is to organize the psyches of theIr consumers.'"
In this context Richards' talk of 'acceptance of life' is, as he himself
might say, 'systematically ambiguous'." On the one hand, it means a
willingness to contemplate ugliness and horror in an uninhibited,
honest and courageous way. This kind of emotional freedom and
strength is what is needed to read Ulysses, and Ulysses itself promotes
these qualities. 'Only those who are unprepared for nothing, however
painful, repellent, or abhorrent, that life can offer will escape shock,
perhaps severe shock, from ItS titanlike convulsIOns ... But upon those
who arc ripe its robust acceptance of everything has an enheartening,
calming effect that comes like a culmination of all the tendencies of
the century'." nut, on the other hand, the recoil from politics and
issues of social change suggests a meaning of 'acceptance' as a conser-
vative leaving of social arrangements as the)' arc. This IS after all what
Richards is proposing. What is remarkable ahout thIS essay IS that the
proposal is for once explicit: 'We feel a need lor order in our own minds
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before we can set about ordering the affairs of men in general' ..,. In this
double meaning of 'acceptance' we can see both what is best ami what
is worst in the liheralism of the interwar )'l'ars. Analysing this ambi-
guity becomes the discrimination between what is true in Richards'
psychological aesthetics, its grasp of the real power of works of litera-
ture and art to reorder the psyche in a beneficial wa)< and what is
merely the ideological expression of the needs of a particular social
group, needs that an: to be satisfied by illusion, by a false consciousness
about the social world.
Richards' Version ofHistoricism
H. G. Wells and G. H. Shaw were both sOCialists (as was Russell at this
time). Richards never mentions socialism in hiS essay, but, if I may be
permitted the expected .\'1arxist expression, thiS can hardly be a coin-
cidence. The idea of sOCialism, as a looming off-stage presencc, is sug-
gcsted by Richards' remarks on the historicising of the present agc in
relation to the past. Richards rejects the analoh'Y of history as an
'army' With 'guidcs, vanguard, main hody, and laggards, advanCing like
a procession or wnrhing by like a snake'.'" In Richards' consCiousness
this is probably only an allusion to the 'avant garde' of the 1920S in art.
But the avant garde itself modelled its self-Image on Lenin's concep-
tion of the vanguard party, and of history as a military advance."
Richards is an idealist in his conception of history. since he sees it
as the development of the 'spirit of man' or as the growth of the
mind." His prct'erred analogy for this process is then, Inevitably,
organic. He wants to sec history as the growth of a tree, since a tree
grows in many places and in many directions at once." And this kind
ofgrowth allows tor diverSity, and even for some opposition. 'A subtle
and Incessant f1\'aln' berween different trends IS necessary for this
. .
growth. Forking and ramification are not a calamity, but a condition
of health. Our question here IS simply: Where IS the sap most vigor-
ously tlowlng?'"
The difference between the two analogies IS less than might
appear at first Sight. The vcry Idea of history as a process of develop-
ment necessarily means a diVISion between what is in the to refro nt ,
and what is still coming along behind. RIChards has his laggarcts, such
as de Ia Mare and the early Yeats, who cling to the old tarms and
Interests of the nineteenth cent ur\', and he has his vanguard poets,
such as Eliot, who rcpresent a genuine response to the needs of the
present, and who lead where others perforce must follow.
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The choice of analogy then is determined by emotive considera-
tions, or at most considerations of emphasis. Richards wants to
emphasise the diversity and livingness of poetic creativity as against
the reduction to identity and mechanical routine of soldiers
marching in an army. Hut this is beside the point, since what his
rejection of vanguard, stragglers and so on is really rejecting is the
whole notion of history as a process of development. Richards is
caught in the contradiction that as a Cambridge positivist, who
shares in the revolt against Hegelian Idealism'" he wants to reject the
notion of history as a 'procession'," while at the same time he is
bound to smuggle the notion back into his discourse in order to be
able to distinguish between those artists who represent new growth
and those who do not.
By his analogy of the tree Richards locates himself within Romanti-
cism. And we can see that by this Romantic analogy he is attempting to
resist a view of history either Hegelian or Marxist. But since Richards'
historicising discourse is marked by these contradictions and denials,
we may try what an historical materialist analysis of Richards' historical
context can provide. This brings me to the second part of this paper
and, however unlikely it may seem, to Georg Lukacs.
II
Luluics and the Crisis ofthe 'Philosophy ofLife ,
In The Destruction of Reason Lukacs traces the rise of Romantic Irra-
tionalism as the predominant trend in German intellectual life, from the
end of the French Revolutionary period to the rise of fascism and the
Hitler regime." The major philosophical figures affected, to a ,greater or
lesser extent, by this trend are Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche,
Dilthey, and In the twentieth century, Heidegger and Jaspers:'
Romantic Irrationalism rejects not only the rationalism of the eigh-
teenth cenrury but also the latter's radical tendency towards materi-
alism. As a consequence, Romantic Irrationalism embraces intu-
itiOnism, and tends towards mystiCism:" Lukacs locates this whole intel-
lecrual development in the context of the socio-economic development
of Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and of the class
conflicts and political crises that accompanied that development.
One particular aspect of Lukacs' thesis IS relevant to this essay.
Lukacs finds what he calls the 'Philosophy of Life' {die Lebensphiloso-
phid to be the dominant trend in German philosophy during the
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Imperialist period, that is, the period from, say, the late 1880s
through to World War 11.'" In Lukacs' view the Philosophy of Life,
with its key categories of 'life' [das Leben] and 'hved experience' {lias
Erlebnis]' served the contradictory needs of the German bourgeois
class for both a subjective ideahst philosophy with which to oppose
materialism (more specifically the dialectical materialism of the
rising social democratic labour movement), and for a Weltanschauung,
a world-view, in which to find meaning and value, in a world made
increasingly meaningless and insecure by the development of
monopoly capitalism during the Imperialist period:'
For Lukacs World War I is a turnIng-point in this development.
Hefore the war the cmis in German society is merely felt to be
impendmg, and so IS registered only as a concern for theoretical
retlection, or as a concern about the state of culture.'~ Hut, after the
war, the crisis has become real; it has happened, and the German
middle class is faced with an insecurity that is both social and mate-
rial." As a result, the predominant mood of society changes from one
of a still tenable faith in the power of Life (against everything mori-
bund or mechanical), to one of despair and nihilism."
Lukacs sees this change of mood, plausibly enough, as responsible
for the shift from the positive kind of life Philosophy represented
by O,lthey and Nietzsche to the negative kind represented by the
existentiahsm of Heidegger and Jaspers." For Oilthey and Nietzsche
'Life' is still compatible with, indeed encourages, sOCIal and political
engagement (whether the liberal statesmanship endorsed by Oilthey,
or the grotesque fantaSies of Nietzsche to breed a new ruling caste
for Europe):" Hut for Heidegger and Jaspers 'Life' is no longer the
central category of philosophy. Human life IS now threatened with
becoming inessential, meaningless, a mere nothingness. In this situa-
tion 'Existence' becomes the key category." For Heidegger what IS
positive in human life is stripped back to the pure will, the unmoti-
vated choice by which we decide for an authentic or inauthentic
life'-' We can either decide tor ourselves, with resolution, how to
live.'" Or, we can follow the crowd, 'the one' [das Man], and abandon
our own power of choice. For this philosophy the social world is
reduced to the sphere of mass conformism, the sphere of the inau-
thentic... ' And tor borh philosophers the cultivation of individual
authenticity tends to displace political (especially long-term political)




Richards and Dilthey: Poetics and the Philosophy ofLife
Rene Wellek has compared Richards' psychological poetics with the
poetics of Dilthey.": In both thinkers the poem is seen as the embodi-
ment of an experience, which is to be communicated from the poet's
mind to the reader's. The reader has the task of recreating in his own
mind the experience within the poem.'" Richards does not use or refer
to Dilthey's term nt1cherleben or 'reliving', but what Richards calls
'interpretation' is the same process. The poet forms an experience
into words, and the reader uses the words as signs by means of which
to re-form the experience in his own mlnd.'~ This similarity between
Richards and Dilthey as to the communICation of poetic experience is
founded in a parallel between Richards' psychology and emotivism,
and Dilthey's psychology and Philosophy of Life. For both Richards
and Dilthey the function of poetry (and art in general) is to organize
and develop the pSYl:he, and to enhance its vitality. For Dilthey: 'The
function of poetry is thus, at its root, one of preserving, strength-
ening, and awakening this sense of life in us. Poetry continually leads
us back to this intensity of the feeling of life, which fills us in our
finest moments ... the poet can bring us a more healthful appreCIation
of life ... [He] can teach us to feel and enJoy the whole world as lived
experience - always as full. whole, healthy human beings','" As we have
seen, what Richards wants from literature is 'closer contact with life',
'a fuller, less inhibited, and more natural response in feeling', an
ordering of the feelings, and a WIder and more robust 'acceptance of
life'.~' In Dilthey there is more emphasis on enJoyment of experience.
while in Richards the emphasis now seems to fall on an almost Stoical
contemplation of experience that may be painful and repellent. Bur
this contrast is very pertinent to Lukacs' focus on World War I as a
turning point. I shall return to this.
Wellek thinks, no doubt correctly, that Richards probably did not
read Dilthey. The Diltheyan conception of poetics, according to
\'V'ellek. was probably transmitted to Richards by the mediation of
others."; But It seems reasonahle to follow Wellek in seeing the par-
allel between Richards and DJlthey in poetics, and thence to con-
Sider Richards' work in relation to the philosophical trend of the
Philosophy ot Litt:, out of which Dilthey's poetics arose.
Intellectual Trends in Britain and Germany
The British Intellectual context dUring the Imperialist period differs
significantly from the German, with which Lukacs was concerned. In
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Germany positivism and idealism give way to the Philosophy of life;
or, if any other philosophical tendencies survive, they become
informed by the outlook of the Philosophy of Life.'" By contrast, in
Britain the Philosophy of Life never becomes the dominant trend in
philosophy. In philosophy the conflict is maintained between a Neo-
Hegelian Idealism (Green, Bradley, Bosanquet et aI), and a rcvived
positivism (Russell, Wittgenstein)."" But in thc world ofliterature and
the arts, in Britain, thcre are parallels to German Romantic Irra-
tionaltsm and the Philosophy of Life. 'Life' as the supremc Romantic
valuc, asserted against both the dead and the mechanical, pervades
latc nInetccnth and carly twcntieth century litcrature, culminating In
D. H. Lawrencc's apotheosis of Life in his 'dark gods', and in Leavis's
espousal of Lawrence's conccrn with Life. Richards himsclf points to
examples of Romantic Irrationalism in Yeats and Lawrence. And the
influence of Romanticism in the sphere of theory is suggested by
Richards' felt need to polemiclse against the views of). Middleton
Murry and Herbert Read. ,,,
We can therefore see Richards' work as an attempt to restate the
kind of Romantic poetics and Philosophy of Life to be found in Dilthey
in the terms of positivism. But, because Richards is a strict positiVist,
and wants to preserve all real knowledge for science, his poetics (as
Wellek notes) becomes one-sidedly subjectivist. Whereas Dilthey rec-
ognizes the obJective aspect of artistic representation in a doctrine of
cyprcalit)\ Richards has no counterpart to this." Richards only resem-
bles Dilthey in relation to the subjective side of aesthetic experience, in
the notions of reliving or reproducing the experience put into the poem
by the poet, and ot" the purpose for which this is done, to order the
psyche, to organize the emotions, and to enhance the vitality of the
readcr's mind. Wellek aptly calls this 'emotionalism divorced from an
obJect'. I? Rut Richards' refusal to recognize any objectivity in art is in
rurn due to his positivistic desire that art should have no capacity to
challenge science on the terram ofdoctrine. Richards wants to enJoy the
benefits of Lawrence's intuitive understanding of emotional life,
without having to subscribe to Lawrence's metaphysical doctnne of
life, or Lawrence's objections to solar physics."
Historicising I. A. Richards
We can sum up the Gcrman situation, as described by Lukacs, in
this way. Before World War I a positive Philosophy of Life supports
both the Idea of individual life-enhancement through literature and
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the arts, and the idea of sOCIal and political engagement. Rut after
World War I the positive Philosophy of Life IS displaced by a nega-
tive one, in the form of existentialism, which abandons the category
of'Life' for pure 'Existence', and for the motiveless choice of authen-
ticity. This negative Philosophy of Life substitutes personal spiritual
cultivation for social and political engagement.
As compared with this development, Richards' position exhibits
both similarity and difference. Although a post-war intellectual,
Richards preserves the outlook of the positive Philosophy of Life, in
that he continues to believe in the power of Life, and in the strength-
ening and ordering of the emotions, as forces that can 'save us'." In
this respect Richards goes against the German trend. But, Richards
also shares in the German tendency to substitute spiritual self-per-
fection for SOCIal and political engagement. And Richards clearly dis-
plays an Irrationalist recoillrom questions of society and politics. In
these respects Richards' views run parallel to the German trend. It
remains to explain this combination of similanty and difference.
We can explain the relationship between the British and the
German situations in terms of the hIstorical development of the two
countries during the Imperialist period. In Germany the social and
political crisIs is extreme - military defeat. the collapse of the
German Empire, the fragility of the Weimar regime, the hyperinfla-
tion of the 1920S, and the polarisation of politics between commu-
nism and fascism. In this Situation it is hardly surprising that the Life
Philosophy of Dilthey should give way to the cult of Kierkegaard,
and to the angst, the living in the prospect of death, and the choice
of authenticity, 01 Heidegger andJaspers.'o
By contrast, the crisis 10 Britain, although real, is less extreme.
The Empire is preserved, and Rritish capItalism remains stable. But
the British state has been unable to win the war against Germany
without American help. The loss of life during the war has been felt
as an abomination. British armies have tned unsuccessfully to over-
throw the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. And rebellion in Ireland
has led to partition. All thiS has thrown liberalism into crisis. In these
circumstances the optimistic social idealism of the Neo-Hegelians
cannot revive, but positivism with its belief in the power of sCIence
and technology has the opportunity to increase its dominance. The
traditional British conflict between the supporters of Coleridge and
those of Bentham takes a new turn, with an ascendant positivism
offering to 'save' Romanticism hy transforming it mto science.
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Richards is thus located within these trcnds as a positivist intel-
lectual who can still believe in the healing power of feeling, within a
well ordered psyche - provided this Romantic faith is translated into
the terms of the dominant positivism. The Philosophy of Life can be
preserved, despite the war, precisely because the crisis consequent on
the war is nothing like so extreme as that in Germany. What can be
observed, as I noted before, is that the colouring of Life Philosophy
has changed, has darkened. Where Dilthey stressed enjoyment, and
delight in what liie has to offer to experience, Richards emphasises
the conquest of emotional disorder within, and the need for
endurance and strength in the contemplation of a reality that may be
ugly and horrific. But, this said, Richards does preserve the positive
outlook of the Philosophy of Life.
On the other side, Richards, as a liberal, cannot but be affected by
the crisis of liberalism, and to this extent he shares in the recoil from
the optimistic, and rationalist programmes oi pre-war social reform.
Dissociating himself from his rationalist predecessors such as Wells
and Shaw, he separates off the needs oi the psyche from all social and
political issues, and so shares in the German post-war tendency to
substitute spiritual self-perfection for political engagement. Richards
thus presents the paradoxical spectacle of a positivist who privileges
science, who nonetheless manifests the power of positivism's enemy,
Romantic Irrationalism.
• • • • •
In 'Nineteen Hundred and Now' Richards tells us about a repro-
duction of a caricature by Max Heerbohm (reproduced overleaf), that
was hanging in the room where Richards was writing hiS essay. The
caricature depicts the 'Twentieth Century' alkgorically as a 'slender,
hesitant, nerve-racked young man', amidst darkness, staring at an
illuminated question mark." This caricature, published in 1921, seems
to be an apt image of the '920S generation that Richards is about to
describe, since by Richards' own testimony this generation is emo-
tionally disordered, disoriented, and bewildered. It is surprising then
that Richards tells us that the caricature irrttated him, and he flung it
on the fire, as belonging to the nineteenth century rather than to the
twentieth." It seems to me that the only way to interpret thiS act by
Richards is to see It as another Instance oi denial. The image of the
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nerve-racked youth really does correspond to Richards' own account
of his generation. What Richards really objects to, presumably, is the
tone and style of the caricature. the attitude that it adopts to its
subject. Heerbohm (born (872) is a Victorian intellectual who, like
\X/ells. Shaw, and Russell, has lived on into the post-war period, and
who has preserved the sardonic detachment of pre-war satire. It is
thiS that really irritates Richards, one suspects. Beerbohm is not 'one
of us', not one of Richards' 'self-conscious and self-critical {!)'" gener-
ation. Richards' destruction of the caricature suggests the hostility
that post-war irrationalism feels towards the pre-war rationalism that
would criticize it.
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